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1. Introduction 
Nigeria may be summarily described as an oil-driven small open economy. The World Bank classifies 
the country as a lower middle-income economy. The IMF classifies it as an emerging and developing 
economy in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) reports. The economy is also classed as a low human 
development economy based on the Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality-Adjusted 
Human Development Index (IHDI) of the United Nations. 
The performance of fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria is affected largely by the specific attributes 
of the country, key of which are oil dependency and high level of openness. Oil dependency, for 
example, makes the country’s fiscal policy to be affected by challenges such as volatility of oil price, 
oil-related ethnic conflicts, and the voracity effect which involves channelling of public funds into 
private pockets by powerful individuals when there are oil windfalls. The high level of openness, 
caused largely by the liberalization policy of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) introduced in 
the country in 1986, for example, makes the monetary policy of the economy to be susceptible to 
international developments such as fluctuations of the world interest rate. 
In line with this background, the objective of this paper is to review key aspects of the fiscal and 
monetary policies of the country, in order to examine the performance of the policies. The paper has 
findings having vital policy implications. Regarding fiscal policy, the paper finds, for example, that 
although fiscal deficit has dominance over fiscal surplus in the country’s fiscal policy performance, 
policies such as oil-revenue smoothing involving a stabilization fund working together with an oil-
price-based fiscal rule have reduced fiscal deficit, hence the policies should be maintained. Regarding 
monetary policy, the paper finds, for example, that monetary policy has performed better in the 
country in the era of market-based monetary policy approach compared to the era of controlled 
monetary policy approach, implying that the former approach should be maintained. 
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: Section two examines key aspects of Nigeria’s 
fiscal policy. Thereafter, key aspects of the country’s monetary policy are examined in section three. 
Section four touches on the role of openness and globalization in the performance of fiscal and 
monetary policies in the country. Finally, section five presents conclusions and policy lessons.    
2. Fiscal Policy in Nigeria 
The Nigeria Federal Ministry of Finance (FMF) is the main authority in charge of fiscal policy in the 
country. The Ministry is headed by the Minister of Finance who is also called the Coordinating Minister 
of the Economy. Deriving its power from the Finance Ordinance of the country, the Ministry was 
created in 1958 for the purpose of controlling and managing the public finance of the economy (FMF, 
2015). According to the author, some of the specific functions of the Ministry are: 
(i) Preparation of annual budgetary estimates for revenue and expenditure of the national budget. The 
proposed budget presented by the Ministry must be approved by the legislative arm of the 
government, then signed into law by the President of the nation, before it can be implemented 
(Ekeocha, 2012). 
(ii) Designing policies relating to fiscal and monetary issues. This function implies that although the 
Ministry is basically in charge of fiscal policies, its policies are designed to have consonance with 
monetary policies.  
(iii)  Monitoring government revenue from oil and non-oil resources. The Ministry basically does this 
through its fiscal policies and budgetary functions. For example, the Ministry has adopted an oil-price-
based fiscal rule, which is employed by the Ministry in designing the annual budgets (Okonjo-Iweala 
and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Okonjo-Iweala, 2008). 
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(iv) Working alongside international organizations such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on behalf of the country. For example, the Minister of Finance of the country 
attends meetings organized by international organizations. 
(v)  Management of revenue allocations across the tiers of government. The Ministry oversees the 
allocations of revenue to the federal, state, and local governments of the country through the 
principles of fiscal federalism, which is discussed in detail in the following section.  
2.1. Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria 
The system of government operating in Nigeria is federalism, which involves power sharing between 
the federal government, state governments, and local governments. The country has 36 and 774 state 
and local governments respectively. Therefore, the method of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the 
country is fiscal federalism, which involves constitutional provision for the fiscal powers and 
responsibilities of each level of government in relation to expenditures and revenues. 
Table 1 presents expenditure assignment for the three tiers of government of the country, while Table 
2 presents tax jurisdiction and revenue for the three levels of government. As revealed in Table 1, the 
central government is in charge of nationally strategic functions like provision of defence, while the 
local governments are in charge of functions relating to the grass-roots such as the management of 
land use. The residual power of the state governments indicated in the table refers to functions that 
are not assigned to the federal government or the local governments. The exclusive power is for the 
central government to conduct nationally strategic functions, while the concurrent power is for the 
central and state governments to carry out their shared functions (Akindele et al., 2002).   
Regarding revenue, as shown in Table 2, there are revenues that the tiers of government are 
empowered by the constitution to generate themselves through taxation and there are also taxation-
based revenues distributed to them from a common purse. In the table, “law” points to the tier of 
government that is the source of the power backing the collection of tax, “collection” means the level 
of government that legally has the responsibility to collect tax, while retention/right to collect points 
to the tier of government or the account that has the legal right to be the owner or custodian of 
collected revenue. 
The revenues disbursed across the different tiers of government are usually based on a revenue 
allocation formula (RAF), which consists of two sub-formulae through which funds are distributed 
from a national account called the Federation Account, namely the horizontal and vertical allocation 
formulae (Lukpata, 2013; Salami, 2011). The vertical allocation formula indicates the percentages of 
revenue allocated to the three tiers of government from the Federation Account, while the horizontal 
formula shows the percentages of revenue allocated to the states and local governments only, based 
on the initial allocation of the vertical allocation formula. 
The RAF was initially based on the recommendations of ad hoc commissions/committees and the 
approval of the president of the country. Then in 1989 a permanent commission called the Revenue 
Mobilization, Allocation, and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) was established to recommend the RAF and 
deal with other related fiscal matters. In carrying out its functions, the RMAFC is empowered by law to 
function as an autonomous entity that is not subject to the authority of any other organization. 
However, it works with relevant government agencies including the FMF as the main authority in 
charge of fiscal policy in the country (RMAFC, 2015). 
The Federation Account is kept by the Central Bank of the country and disbursement from the account 
to the three tiers of government is by a committee called the Federation Account Allocation 
Committee (FAAC). Key members of the committee include the Minister of States for Finance (chair), 
the Accountant General of the country, RMAFC, and the commissioners of finance of the 36 states of 
the nation (RMAFC, 2015; Lukpata, 2013; Salami, 2011). 
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Table 1: Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities to the Tiers of Government in            
Nigeria 
Federal Only  
Defence 
Foreign affairs 
International trade including export marking 
Currency, banking, borrowing, exchange control 
Use of water resources 
Shipping, federal trunk roads 
Elections 
Aviation, railways, postal service 
Police and other security services 
Regulation of labour, interstate commerce, telecommunications immigration 
Mines and minerals, nuclear energy, citizenship and naturalization rights 
Social Security, insurance, national statistical system (Census births, death, etc.) 
Guidelines and basis for minimum education 
Business registration 
Price control 
Federal-State Shared  
Health, Social welfare 
Education (post primary/technology) 
Culture 
Antiquities 
Monuments, archives 
Statistics, stamp duties 
Commerce, industry 
Electricity (generation, transmission, distribution) 
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Research surveys 
States Only  
Residual power, i.e. subject neither assigned to federal nor local government level 
Local Governments Only  
Economic planning and development 
Health services 
Land use 
Control and regulation of advertisements, pets, small businesses 
Markets, public conveniences 
Social welfare, sewage and refuse disposal, registration of births, death, Marriages 
Primary, adult and vocational education 
Development of agriculture and natural resources 
Source: Jimoh, 2003. 
Table 2: Nigeria’s Tax Jurisdiction and Right to Revenue 
Tax                    Legal Jurisdiction Retention/Right to 
Revenue 
 Law Collection  
Import duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Excise duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Export duties Federal Federal Federation Account 
Mining rents and 
royalty 
Federal Federal Federation Account 
Petroleum profits tax Federal Federal Federation Account 
Capital gains tax Federal State State 
Personal income tax 
(apart from the ones 
listed below) 
Federal State State 
Personal income tax: 
armed and police 
forces, external 
affairs officers, 
residents of the 
Federal Capital 
Territory 
Federal Federal Federal 
 2809 
Value added tax 
(sales tax before 
1994) 
Federal Federal/State Federal/State 
Company tax Federal Federal Federation Account 
Stamp duties Federal State State 
Gift  tax  Federal State State 
Property tax and 
ratings 
State State/Local State/Local 
Licenses and fees Local Local Local 
Motor park dues Local Local Local 
Motor vehicle State Local Local 
Capital transfer tax Federal State State 
Pools betting and 
other betting taxes 
State State State 
Entertainment tax State State State 
Land registration and 
survey fees 
State State State 
Market and trading 
license and fees 
State Local Local 
 Source: Salami, 2011; Jimoh, 2003. 
2.2. Fiscal Deficit in Nigeria 
The behaviour of fiscal deficit in Nigeria is largely influenced by oil  and the developing nature of the 
economy. The following three key features are observable in Figure 1 below, which displays fiscal 
surplus/defict in the country: (i) The relatively high budget-surplus to GDP ratio around the middle of 
the 1970s, which is associated with the oil boom of the time. (ii) The dominance of fiscal deficit over 
fiscal surplus. (iii) Fiscal deficit of less than 5% of  the GDP between 2000-2010, implying more fiscal 
discipline in the sub-period over the previous period. This is likely due to the effects of the 
stabilization fund and the oil-price-based fiscal rule established in the sub-period.1 Another plausible 
reason for the fiscal discipline is the country’s strive to meet the covergence criteria of the proposed 
West Africa Monetary Zone (WAMZ), which was initially designed to start in the early 2000s.2   
Furthermore, the comovements in the graphs of Figure 2 below, which displays movements in nominal 
GDP growth rate and fiscal surplus/deficit in Nigeria, particularly some of the outliers of the graphs, 
give the perception of procyclicality of fiscal policy in Nigeria, which is a common characteristic of 
                                                          
1The oil-price-based fiscal rule is used as a tool of channelling oil revenue into the budget via a benchmark oil 
price. Excess oil revenue is saved in the stabilization fund when the actual price of the oil market is higher than 
the benchmark price, while dissaving is done when the actual price is lower than the benchmark price.   
2Achieving a fiscal deficit of no more than 4% of the GDP by all the proposing members of the monetary union 
is one of the convergence criteria of the union. The monetary union was to start in 2003 with the following 
proposing members: Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. But the starting date has been 
postponed five times, because the proposing members have not all met the convergence criteria for starting it. 
The five postponements are: from 2003 to 2005, from 2005 to 2010, from 2010 to 2014, from 2014 to 2015, and 
from 2015 to 2020.  
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fiscal policy in developing countries (Talvi and Végh, 2005). These authors and others (e.g. Lane, 2003; 
Lane and Tornell, 1998) argue that political economy externalities associated with the diffusion of 
political power among different authorities may be the key factor causing the procyclicality of fiscal 
policy. In Nigeria’s case, the fiscal federalism adopted by the country, which distributes power 
between the three tiers of government and multiple organizations and agencies within the different 
levels of government, can lead to proliferation of authorities that may be “competing” for their shares 
of national resources. The quest to have the best share of the “national cake” by multiple authorities 
may put pressure on national resources and cause government expenditure to increase during booms 
and decrease during recessions. 
For example, based on possible implicit rent-seeking motives, the 36 state governments and some 
individuals in political positions in Nigeria sued the federal government over the illegality of the 
Excess Crude Account (ECA) established by the latter for the purpose of saving surplus oil revenue 
during oil booms and dissaving during oil revenue shortfalls (see for examples, This Day Live 
Newspaper, 2014; Channels TV, 2012). The central argument underlying the alleged illegality is that 
section 162(1) of the Nigerian constitution indicates that all revenues earned by the federal 
government, with the exception of certain proceeds from the personal income tax that only the 
federal government has the right to collect, should be kept only in the Federation Account and not in 
any other account. The exempted personal income tax proceeds include proceeds from the armed 
forces of the country, the Ministry of external affairs, the police force, and the residents of the Federal 
Capital Territory, as shown in Table 2 above. The developments affected the continuity of the building 
process of the ECA and led to its replacement by a sovereign wealth fund (see Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute, 2015; http://www.swfinstitute.org). 
Therefore, the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority Act of 2011 was enacted, upon which the 
establishment of the Nigerian Sovereign Investment Authority (NSIA) is based. The 2011 Act 
authorizes the NSIA to function as an independent entity to manage Nigeria’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, 
which has three sub-funds jointly owned by the three arms of the government of the country, namely 
the Future Generations Fund, the Nigeria Infrastructure Fund, and the Stabilization Fund (see Nigerian 
Sovereign Investment Authority, 2015; http://nsia.com.ng). As the author shows, in line with the names 
of the three sub-funds, they capture three main purposes: (i) saving for future generations; (ii) 
infrastructure development; and (iii) protection of the macroeconomy against external shocks 
associated with the dependence of the country on the export of hydrocarbons, particularly crude oil.  
Figure 1: Fiscal Surplus/Deficit in 
Nigeria (1970-2010) 
 
Data Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2010 Edition. 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Surplus/Deficit (% of GDP)
Surplus/Deficit (% of GDP)
 2811 
Figure 2:Nominal GDP Growth Rate and Fiscal Surplus/Deficit in Nigeria (1970-2010) 
 
Data Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, 2010 Edition. 
3. Monetary Policy in Nigeria 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), headed by a Governor, is the main authority in charge of monetary 
policy in Nigeria, with legal authority over other banks. The Bank came into being in 1959, deriving its 
power from the Central Bank Act of 1958, which has different amended versions (CBN, 2015). The 
earlier Act of the Bank was replaced by the CBN Act of 2007. The operations of the Bank have been 
based on the framework created by the Acts. The operations reflect the relationships of the Bank with 
the government, other banks in the country, and the economy as a whole. Discussions of the key 
features of  the operations are done as follows.  
3.1. Central Bank Independence 
According to CBN (2015), the CBN Act of 2007 gives the Bank full independence compared to the 
limited autonomy of the previous Act. However, the full independence is practically in terms of the 
Bank’s power to use monetary instruments. That is, the independence may be termed instrument 
independence, as distict from goal independence (Ojo, 2013). Crowe and Meade (2008) distinguish 
between the two types of independece, based on the works of Debelle and Fischer (1995) and Fischer 
(1995).  
Instrument independence implies that a central bank is legally free to use monetary policy instruments 
to achieve the goals set by a higher authority, which is usually the government.On the other hand, 
goal independence gives the bank the power to set monetary policy objectives. Therefore, based on 
the nature of the independence of the CBN, it is subject to the Nigerian federal government in some 
way, which may give room for political interference in the operations of the Bank and affect its 
performance. For example, such political interference may affect policy coordination between the CBN 
and the fiscal authority. 
3.2. Implicit Inflation Targeting 
The main objectives that the CBN pursues as stated in the CBN Act of 2007 (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria Official Gazatte, 2007) are: 
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(a) Monetary and price stability. 
(b) Provision of legal tender currency. 
(c) Management of external reserves to protect the international value of the currency. 
(d) Fostering a sound financial system in the country. 
(e) Serving as the banker of the Federal Government, and providing economic and financial advice to 
the government. 
A key feature of the 2007 Act distiguishing it from the 1958 Act and its amendments is that it has price 
stability explicitly stated as one of the objectives of the Bank (Ojo, 2013). Achieving low inflation 
gradually became the focus of the CBN since the introduction of the 2007 Act, with the interest rate 
being the main policy instrument (Ojo, 2013; Nnanna, 2001; Chibundu, 2009), which is consistent with 
the policy implications of the New Consesus Macroeconomics (NCM) (Arestis, 2009).  
Unlike advanced countries like New Zealand, Canada, and United Kingdom; and emerging markets like 
Brazil, Chile, and South Africa that have formerly adopted the Inflation Targeting (IT) policy, Nigeria 
only adopts the partial dimension of the policy. Economies like the US, the Euro Area, Japan, and 
Switzerland also adopt some of the features of the IT, and like Nigeria the economies are not classified 
as IT economies in the literature (Roger, 2010). 
A key element of the IT framework is that the central bank of an economy directly and explicitly 
announces a particular numerical value of the inflation target as the primary and only goal of 
monetary policy, with inflation being the only monetary variable for which a target is announced (IMF, 
2006; Ojo, 2013; Roger, 2010). Besides, it is also necessary in formal inflation targeting that inflation 
forecasts are obtained and published to serve as guides regarding possible inflation pressures. 
The CBN targets “single digit” inflation, using market-based instruments, particularly the interest rate, 
to achieve the “inflation target,” while pursuing the achievement of other monetary policy objectives, 
reflecting the indirect and implicit form of the policy. That is, the country’s inflation target is “single 
digit inflation” and price stability is not explicitly the priority among the five objectives of the CBN 
stated above. 
3.3. Interest Rate as the Main Policy Instrument 
As indicated earlier, the interest rate is the main monetary policy instrument of the CBN in achieving 
the objectives. The dynamics through which the instrument works is that a central interest rate serves 
as the anchor for the other rates, so that variations in the anchor rate initiates desired policy changes 
in the other rates and the system as a whole. The interest rates currently used in monetary policy by 
the CBN include: interbank discount rate, Treasury Bill rate, saving deposit rate, fixed deposit rate, 
lending rate, and Monetary Policy Rate (MPR), with the MPR serving as the anchor rate. 
The MPR was introduced in 2006 to replace the Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) which was the initial 
anchor rate. The MRR was replaced because it was not effective in anchoring other rates, which made 
changes in it to have insignificant impact on the broad macroeconomy (Ononugbo, 2012). There has 
been improvement in the performance of monetary policy since the introduction of the MPR, 
particularly in terms of inflation rate (Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014), which is a main objective of the policy. 
Figure 3 below displays the average inflation rates in Nigeria before and after the introduction of the 
MPR.  
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Figure 3: Average Inflation Rates in Nigeria 
Source: Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014. 
A plausible factor of the success of the MPR is the market-based or indirect monetary policy approach 
under which the interest rate works. The approach has been the method of monetary policy adopted 
by the CBN since 1993. The market-based method of monetary policy is generally regarded to be the 
most effective approach. For example, direct monetary instruments like administrative control of 
interest rates may lead to inefficient resource allocation in the economy.  
3.4. Monetary Policy Frameworks in Nigeria 
Generally, the phases of monetary policy approaches in Nigeria may be broadly divided into two, 
namely the exchange rate targeting phase (1959-1973) and the monetary targeting phase (1974-date), 
with the latter having direct (1974-1992) and market-based monetary targeting (1993-date) sub-
phases (see for examples, Chibundu, 2009; Nnanna, 2001; Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014). The exchange 
rate targeting and direct monetary targeting frameworks involved administrative determination of  
monetary policy variables. 
Exchange rate targeting started with fixing the exchange rate between the Nigerian currency and the 
British currency, while the direct monetary targeting involved the CBN setting the interets rate, 
identifying priority sectors of the economy, and directing banks on the allocation of credit to the 
sectors accordingly. Monetary aggregates were controlled through these processes. However, under 
the indirect monetary targeting, tools like the Open Market Operation (OMO) are employed to 
achieve the targets of monetary aggregates, which are determined in line with the general 
macoeconomic policies of the country.  
Again, in terms of low inflation as a key monetary policy objective, monetary policy under the indirect 
monetary targeting regime has perfomed well on average, with headline inflation falling from over 
70% in 1996 to below 10% in August 2013, as shown in Figure 4 below (Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014). 
Besides, according to these authors, real growth under the regime rose from about 0.8% in 1994 to 
about 6.6% in 2012, as shown in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 4: Headline Inflation under Different Monetary Regimes in Nigeria 
 
Source: Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014. 
Figure 5: Real GDP Growth under Different Monetary Regimes in Nigeria 
Source: Mordi and Adebiyi, 2014. 
4. Nigeria’s Openness and Globalization: Implications for the Performance of Fiscal and 
Monetary Policies 
Nigeria’s degree of openness and globalization is relatively high. Obadan (2008) notes that the level of 
the country’s trade openness is high, even compared to that of some industrial economies. Nigeria’s 
high openness is not only in terms of trade, as shown in Figure 6 below which indicates openness with 
respect to trade and other forms of cross-country flows.3  
                                                          
3The degree of openness of the figure is defined as the aggregated percentage share of the flows in the GDPs of 
the considered countries. The flows consist of trade (% of GDP); foreign direct investment (FDI) and stocks (% 
of GDP); portfolio investment (% of GDP); and income payments to foreign nationals (% of GDP).   
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Figure 6: The Degrees of Openness in Nigeria and Selected Developed  
Countries (1970-2010)  
 
Source of Data: KOF Swiss Economic Institute (www.kof.ethz.ch). 
Regarding globalization, Nigeria is ranked 81st in 2012 and 67th in 2013 in the world globalization 
ranking, based on the evaluation of 208 and 207 economies respectively (KOF Swiss Economic 
Institute, 2013, www.kof.ethz.ch). The globalization ranking is done annually based on an index that is 
computed by using economic, social, and political factors that affect the global integration of the 
economies evaluated. 
Nigeria’s high degree of openness and globalization has implications for the performance of fiscal and 
monetary policies. For example, due to high level of oil dependency, the volatility of oil price is usually 
transmitted via the channel of oil revenue into the country, leading to volatility in the fiscal sector and 
the broad macroeconomy (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007; Okonjo-Iweala, 2008). Therefore, 
the high degree of openness and globalization of the country implies increased likelihood of hindered 
fiscal policy performance, as openness and globalization increase the degree of cross-border 
transmission of volatility.  
Furthermore, high level of openness and globalization also affects the performance of monetary policy 
of small economies such as Nigeria, in that financial openness and globalization increase the 
susceptibility of such countries to international monetary policy fluctuations. According to the 
traditional small open economy literature (see Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1963; Dornbusch, 1976), 
economies such as Nigeria are too small to individually affect the global economy, but global 
developments such as fluctuations in international interest rate affect their monetary policies. 
5. Conclusions and Policy Lessons 
The above review has led to some conclusions having implications relating to the performance of 
fiscal and monetary policies in Nigeria. The first conclusion is the dominance of fiscal deficit over fiscal 
surplus in the country’s fiscal policy, which points to higher fiscal spending over fiscal revenue. But 
there is stronger fiscal discipline beginning from the 2000s, as fiscal deficits are below 5% of GDP in 
this period. It would be useful to maintain the policies introduced in the 2000s that have led to 
stronger fiscal discipline. Key ones among such policies are: (i) the policy involving a stabilization fund 
and an oil-price-based fiscal rule, both introduced in 2004 and designed to work together to limit 
excessive government spending via the channel of oil revenue smoothing; and (ii) the convergence 
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criteria of WAMZ introduced in the early 2000s, which impose a numerical fiscal deficit limit on the 
proposed members of WAMZ. 
The second conclusion is the procyclicality of fiscal policy, which is likely due to the diffusion of 
political power among the multiple authorities existing within the three tiers of government of the 
country. Such authorities usually compete for the “national cake” during booms, but do not compete 
during recessions, leading to procyclicality of fiscal policy. Since the displeasure of people about 
inequitable distribution of national resources is a major reason for the varying behaviours during 
booms and recessions, promoting equitable distribution of resources will limit procyclicality of fiscal 
policy in the country. 
The third conclusion is that the monetary policy rate which was introduced in 2006 in the country as 
the anchor rate for other interest rates is effective and should be maintained. The performance of 
monetary policy has improved since the introduction of the monetary policy rate. For example, 
inflation rate has reduced significantly in the era of the monetary policy rate, which is a main objective 
of monetary policy in the country. 
The fourth conclusion is the effectiveness of the market-based monetary policy approach introduced 
in the country in 1993. Compared to the period of indirect or controlled monetary policy, monetary 
policy has performed better under the market-based approach. In fact, the effectiveness of the 
monetary policy rate is largely due to the market-based framework within which it works. For example, 
the rigidity of the controlled monetary policy approach usually hinders automatic adjustment to 
shocks, which the flexibility of the market-based approach offers. It would therefore be useful to 
maintain the adoption of the market-based monetary policy approach.  
The fifth and last conclusion is the high level of openness and globalization of the country, which 
affects the performance of both fiscal and monetary policies. High level of openness and globalization 
usually makes small open economies such as Nigeria to be vulnerable to international spillovers, 
particularly the ones originating from developed economies such as the USA, which consequently 
affects the performance of fiscal and monetary policies. It would be useful to keep the factors 
affecting Nigeria’s openness and globalization at the optimum level. Such factors include cross-
country trade and financial flows, international political and social linkages, etc. 
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